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Romania’s Referee Appointment System

Governance gaps, patterns, and unanswered integrity questions (2019–2025).
Date: November 2025 | Author: FIJF Investigative Team
FIJF does not accuse – we investigate.
All information below is based on publicly available reports, official statements, and regulatory documents as of November 2025.
Individuals, clubs and institutions mentioned are presumed innocent unless proven otherwise in a court of law.
FIJF’s role is to gather facts, connect patterns and, where appropriate, call for transparency, accountability and justice.
Romania map, FIJF investigation
Romania – Editorial stock photo Credit: public domain / FIJF library

Introduction – Why referee appointments are an integrity issue

Referee appointments are the quiet engine of competitive trust. Supporters rarely see the machinery behind a delegation list, but they live with its consequences. The referee for a derby, the VAR team for a title-decider, the assistant assigned to a relegation fight: these choices shape perception long before a ball is kicked.

In Romania’s SuperLiga, disputes over refereeing are not new. What is newer — especially since 2019 — is the scale of institutional pressure placed on the appointment system. VAR arrived. Clubs professionalized their media strategies. The betting economy intensified scrutiny. Each of these factors raises the stakes for appointment integrity.

FIJF’s role is not to decide whether Romanian referees are “good” or “bad”. That is a football argument. Our role is to ask a different question: is the appointment system designed to keep influence out — and can that design be demonstrated?

FIJF therefore asks, at the start:

  • If an appointment system is truly independent, why has public confidence deteriorated steadily across recent seasons?
  • If criteria are objective, why are they rarely explained, publicly tested, or audited?
  • If integrity tools exist, why do recurring controversies still appear structurally unresolved?

Chapter 1 – The appointment architecture in Romania (who decides, and how)

The Central Referees Commission (CCA) sits at the center of Romania’s appointment architecture. The CCA evaluates referees, assigns match officials, manages VAR delegations, and decides who rises, who stagnates, and who disappears from top-level lists.

Officially, the process is presented as technical and merit-based. Delegations are published weekly. VAR teams are named publicly. In form, Romania appears aligned with European standards.

But architecture is not only about form. It is about who has the final lever, and what guardrails exist around that lever.

FIJF asks:

  • Who inside CCA holds final authority over a SuperLiga appointment?
  • What checks exist to prevent a single decision-center from becoming a single point of vulnerability?
  • Are appointment decisions reviewed by independent integrity officers, or only by insider structures?
  • How are VAR referees selected for sensitive matches — and is that selection audited differently than on-field roles?
  • When a referee is removed from a match after controversy, is that decision grounded in transparent performance evidence or informal discretion?
FIJF clarity note:
Publishing delegations is necessary. But integrity requires more than publication — it requires explainable, reviewable, auditable criteria.

Chapter 2 – Transparency by publication vs transparency by explanation

Romania publishes delegation lists. This is often cited as proof of transparency. Yet publication is only one layer. A list tells who was appointed, not why.

In governance terms, this creates a predictable collision: clubs and supporters interpret appointments through historical memory, suspicion, and expectation, while the institution expects trust through silence.

Silence can work only if trust already exists. When it does not, silence becomes a vacuum filled with speculation.

FIJF asks:

  • Is Romania’s appointment logic documented anywhere in measurable form (ranking metrics, rotation rules, risk flags)?
  • Do clubs have access to the evaluation data that allegedly supports appointments?
  • Are there published conflict-of-interest restrictions tied to appointments (regional ties, prior affiliations, family links)?
  • If such restrictions exist, how are they enforced during high-stakes match weeks?
  • Would a truly transparent system fear publishing criteria? Or would it gain legitimacy by doing so?
Governance contrast:
In several UEFA associations, appointment committees publish seasonal integrity reports or referee performance frameworks. Romania’s public outputs remain narrower. Is this a choice based on capacity, culture, or risk management?

Chapter 3 – The VAR era: new tools, old vulnerabilities?

VAR entered Romania as a promise of objective correction. In theory, VAR reduces human error. In practice, VAR introduces a second layer of appointment power: who sits in the booth can be as decisive as who carries the whistle.

Since 2019, Romania has expanded VAR usage and built VAR-qualified referee pools. But the integrity question is not whether VAR exists. It is whether the VAR appointment logic is protected against the same risks that historically shadow on-field appointments.

FIJF asks:

  • Who appoints VAR teams for derbies, title races, and relegation battles — and are they selected under stricter rules?
  • Is VAR performance evaluated with transparent grading equal to on-field referees?
  • Do certain VAR officials appear repeatedly in the league’s most sensitive fixtures?
  • If yes, is that repetition explained by objective excellence, or by informal reliance on a narrow trusted circle?
  • Could a system meant to reduce controversy unintentionally concentrate influence in fewer hands?
Football fans react angrily because of a referee decision - FIJF investigation
Football stadium – stock image Credit: royalty-free / FIJF library

Chapter 4 – Patterns in high-stakes match delegations (2019–2025)

In any football ecosystem, high-stakes matches reveal the philosophy of the appointment body. The officials chosen for derbies, title races, and relegation clashes show where the institution places trust — and whether that trust is distributed or concentrated.

Between 2019 and 2025, Romanian SuperLiga delegations suggest a recurring institutional tendency: a limited circle of referees and VAR officials repeatedly appear in the league’s most sensitive fixtures. FIJF does not interpret this as proof of wrongdoing. We interpret it as a governance pattern that requires clarity.

FIJF asks, neutrally but firmly:

  • Is repeated high-stakes selection driven by measurable excellence, or by institutional habit?
  • Does concentration of top appointments create exposure to pressure from clubs, media, or intermediaries?
  • Are rotation rules formalized and applied predictably, or adjusted case-by-case in opaque ways?
  • When exceptions occur, are they documented and explainable to stakeholders?
  • Could predictable delegation patterns themselves become an integrity vulnerability in themselves?
FIJF clarity note:
Concentration of appointments can be legitimate. But legitimacy must be explainable through transparent criteria and audit trails.

Chapter 5 – Conflicts of interest: what is forbidden, what is tolerated?

Every association writes conflict-of-interest rules. The integrity test is whether those rules are enforced consistently, especially around sensitive matches.

Romania’s official framework forbids insider betting and prohibits referees from actions that threaten neutrality. Yet the public rarely sees how these rules are translated into appointment safeguards.

FIJF asks:

  • Are referees systematically restricted from officiating matches involving clubs from their region or past environment?
  • Are potential family, business, or mentorship ties declared and centrally logged?
  • How often are referees withdrawn from delegations due to conflict flags, and are those withdrawals explained?
  • Is conflict screening automated through federation databases, or reliant on manual discretion?
  • Does the federation publish any anonymised conflict-of-interest reporting to strengthen public trust?

Chapter 6 – Performance evaluation and promotions: the invisible ladder

The credibility of appointments rests on performance evaluation. If promotions and demotions are perceived as opaque, delegation lists become vulnerable to skepticism.

In Romania, detailed evaluation frameworks are not routinely accessible to the public. This does not imply misconduct; it implies a transparency gap that feeds doubt.

FIJF asks:

  • What measurable metrics determine eligibility for top-tier matches and VAR roles?
  • Are errors weighted consistently across referees, or does discipline vary by context?
  • Do evaluations include independent oversight outside CCA hierarchy?
  • Are seasonal ranking systems published in anonymised form for credibility?
  • Do promotion timelines correlate with documented performance, or with informal institutional reliance?
Governance pressure point:
An opaque promotion ladder can turn appointments into signals rather than merit outcomes. In any UEFA league, that is an integrity risk.

Chapter 7 – Club pressure, media storms, and referee protection

SuperLiga is a high-pressure environment. Clubs issue public statements, media analysis is continuous, and social platforms magnify every phase.

A strong appointment system must filter reality from noise and protect officials from reactive governance.

FIJF asks:

  • Does CCA protect referees from external pressure — or does it adapt delegations in response to pressure?
  • When clubs attack referees publicly, what institutional safeguards prevent intimidation from shaping appointments?
  • Are referees supported psychologically and professionally after high-profile controversies?
  • Does public outrage accelerate “punitive removals” without transparent performance evidence?
  • Can any appointment body remain credible if its decisions are perceived as media-driven?

Chapter 8 – Integrity monitoring: what systems exist, and what data is shared?

Modern integrity protection relies on real-time cooperation between federations, licensed betting monitors, law enforcement, and independent integrity firms.

Romania participates in integrity monitoring frameworks, but public visibility of how alerts influence appointments remains limited.

FIJF asks carefully:

  • Do integrity alerts feed directly into appointment risk models for upcoming fixtures?
  • Is there a dedicated integrity officer embedded in referee governance?
  • How quickly are betting anomalies reviewed in relation to ref/VAR assignments?
  • Are referees notified when their matches trigger alerts, and are they protected during review?
  • If data is shared, is it integrated — or does it remain siloed across agencies?

Without transparent answers, integrity becomes a patchwork — strong in theory, uneven in practice.

Football graphic - FIJF visual
Football graphic – FIJF visual Credit: FIJF design set

Chapter 9 – Comparative lessons from Europe

Romania is not isolated in confronting appointment skepticism. European precedents show that integrity crises emerge when appointment control is concentrated, conflicts are under-declared, and evaluation remains invisible.

FIJF extracts neutral lessons:

  • Independence is structural: committees must be insulated from club politics by rules and external oversight.
  • Conflicts must be logged: neutrality cannot rely on assumption or informal knowledge.
  • Rotation reduces exposure: predictable repeat assignments are pressure multipliers.
  • VAR needs equal safeguards: booth appointments can shape matches as much as on-field officials.
  • Annual transparency builds trust: silence fuels suspicion, even without wrongdoing.

The key lesson: trust cannot be demanded — it must be demonstrated. Does the Romanian system demonstrate enough?

Chapter 10 – Reform promises and measurable safeguards

Romanian football authorities regularly reaffirm commitment to integrity, professionalism, and neutrality. Such statements are necessary — but FIJF evaluates credibility through measurable safeguards.

FIJF asks:

  • Which reforms since 2019 can be measured publicly, not only described rhetorically?
  • Have appointment criteria been strengthened or merely reiterated?
  • Are evaluation systems more transparent now than in 2019?
  • Has VAR introduced new accountability structures — or new appointment opacity?
  • Is the integrity function resourced to prevent risk, not only respond after crises?
FIJF principle:
Reform is not a press release. Reform is a structure that survives political cycles and protects competitions automatically.

Chapter 11 – FIJF recommendations (neutral, practical, defensible)

FIJF does not accuse, prosecute, or discipline. We propose safeguards that reduce exposure to manipulation and restore public confidence.

  • 1. Independent integrity oversight: an integrity office outside CCA hierarchy to audit appointments, conflicts, and alert-handling.
  • 2. Publish delegation criteria: anonymised seasonal framework explaining rotation logic, risk tiers, and VAR assignment rules.
  • 3. Conflict-of-interest registry: mandatory annual declarations for all referees and appointment decision-makers.
  • 4. Rotation caps for sensitive fixtures: clear limits on repeated assignments involving the same clubs.
  • 5. Integrity-alert integration: automated internal checks when betting anomalies appear before new high-stakes appointments.
  • 6. Referee protection protocol: psychological and operational support to stop intimidation from shaping governance.
  • 7. Annual integrity report: anonymised disclosures on conflicts handled, alerts processed, and governance changes implemented.

Conclusion – The questions Romania must answer

FIJF does not claim corruption in Romanian refereeing. What we document is a modern integrity stress test: a system under pressure, operating with limited public explanation, and therefore exposed to suspicion.

Trust in football is not rebuilt by asking supporters to “believe”. It is rebuilt by showing how appointments are protected, how conflicts are screened, how VAR is governed, and how integrity alerts are integrated into decisions.

The core FIJF question remains:

  • If the system is robust, why does it still struggle to convince the public that it is?
  • If criteria are objective, why are they not visible enough to neutralize recurring doubt?
  • If oversight exists, why does it feel institutionally distant from the weekly reality of delegations?

Sources and references

This investigation is based on publicly available appointment archives, federation regulations, integrity frameworks, VAR governance documentation, and comparative European precedents (2019–2025). FIJF welcomes verifiable documentation and factual corrections from credible sources.